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No. 6069. In Bank. Sept. 17, 1957.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RODNEY G. 
SHERAN, Defendant and Appellant. 
Criminal Law-Appeal-Modification of Judgment.-On appli-
cation to reduce the degree or class of an offense, the trial 
judge may review the weight of the evidence, but an appellate 
court should consider only its sufficiency as a matter of law. 
(Pen. Code, § 1181, subd. 6.) 
Id.-New Trial-Insufficiency of Evidence.-In passing on a 
motion for new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence, it 
is the exclusive province of the trial court to judge the credibil-
ity of witnesses, determine the probative force of testimony, 
and weigh the evidence. 
3b] Id.-New Trial-Insufficiency of Evidence.-In consider-
ing the sufficiency of evidence on a motion for new trial, the 
court may draw inferences opposed to those drawn at the trial, 
and where the only conflicts consist of inferences deduced from 
uncontradicted probative facts, the court may resolve such con-
flicts in determining whether the case should be retried. 
[4] !d.-Appeal-Review of Findings on Motion for New Trial.-
A reviewing court will reverse the trial court's determination 
on a motion for new trial for insufficiency of the evidence only 
where it can be said as a matter of law that there is no 
substantial evidence to support a contrary judgment. 
[5] ld.-New Trial-Insufficiency of Evidence.-While it is the 
exclusive province of the jury to find the facts, it is the duty 
of the trial court to see that this function is intelligently and 
justly performed, and in the exercise of its supervisory power 
over the verdict the court, on motion for new trial, should 
consider the probative force of the evidence and satisfy itself 
that the evidence as a whole is sufficient to sustain the verdict. 
Id.-Verdict-Modiflcation.-The power given by Pen. Code, 
§ 1181, subd. 6, to the trial court to modify a verdict or 
judgment without granting a new trial is to be exercised as 
that court typically functions, and since the court is given 
both the power to grant a new trial and to reduce the degree 
or class of crime in the same section, the court's exercise of 
the power is the same in both cases. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 663 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law,§ 1446; [2, 3, 5) Crimi-
nal Law, § 948 ; [ 4] Criminal Law, § 1339 ; [ 6] Criminal Law, § 934 ; 
[7] Homicide, § 272; [8] Homicide, § 148; [9] Homicide, § 23; 
[10] Criminal Law, § 952; [11] Criminal Law, §§ 970(5), 970(6). 
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[7] Homicide-Appeal-Disposition.-Unless a reviewing court can 
say as a matter of law that there was no evidence or inference 
therefrom contrary to those drawn by the jury in returning 
a verdict of second degree murder, the trial court's determina-
tion that defendant was guilty of no crime greater than 
manslaughter, and its order reducing the crime to that class, 
should be affirmed. 
[8] Id.-Evidence-Manslaughter.-The trial court's conclusion in 
an uxoricide case that defendant was guilty of no crime greater 
than manslaughter was sustained by evidence that he lived 
in great fear of being returned to a state hospital where he had 
once been incarcerated at his wife's instigation, and that he 
told the arresting officer that he and his wife had driven into 
the hills (where her body was found) and that an argument 
had ensued after which everything went "blooey," since it was 
reasonable to infer that the couple quarreled and that defend-
ant, having lost all ability to reason, struck her the fatal blows 
in the heat of passion. (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. 1.) 
[9] Id.-Manslaughter-Provocation.-The provocation which will 
stir in the heart of the slayer that heat of passion which re-
duces a homicide from murder to manslaughter must be such 
as would have a like effect on the mind and emotions of 
the average man-the man of ordinary self-control. 
[10] Criminal Law-New Trial-Newly Discovered Evidence.-To 
entitle a party to a new trial on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence, it must appear that the evidence is not merely 
cumulative, but is material, that it is such as to render a 
different result probable on retrial, and that the party could not 
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced it at 
the trial. 
[11] Id.-New Trial-Newly Discovered Evidence.-.A motion for 
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence based 
on sodium pentothal examinations, as a result of which defend-
ant thought he could recall some of his movements on the day 
of the murder charged, was properly denied where it could 
not be said as a matter of law that a different result would 
have been probable on a new trial, and where no reason was 
given as to defendant's failure to submit to such examinations 
prior to or during the course of the trial. 
APPEALS from a judgment of the Superior Court of Marin 
County and from orders reducing the class of crime charged 
and denying a new trial. Carlos Raymond Freitas, Judge. 
Affirmed. 
[9) See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 130; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 22. 
Sept. 1957] PEOPLE v. SHERAN 
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Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of second 
degree murder, reduced to manslaughter, affirmed. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, Victor Griffith, Deputy Attorney 
General, William 0. Weissich, District Attorney (Marin), and 
Roger Garety, Assistant District Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
Bagshaw, Schaal, Martinelli & Talley, Bagshaw, Schaal & 
Martinelli and Thomas E. Schaal for Defendant and Ap-
pellant. 
CARTER, J.-Defendant, Rodney G. Sheran, was found 
guilty by a jury of the second degree murder of his wife, 
Esme.1 Defendant's motion for a new trial on the ground of 
newly discovered evidence was denied by the trial court which, 
however, granted defendant's motion to modify the verdict 
by reducing the crime from second degree murder to man-
slaughter. The People appeal from the order reducing the 
class of the crime; defendant appeals from the order denying 
his motion for a new trial. 2 
The body of a deceased woman was found at approximately 
10 :30 on the morning of May 26, 1955, lying on a fire road 
in the hills of Marin County about four miles from Fairfax. 
The record shows that the body was identified later that day 
as Esme Sheran, the wife of the defendant; that her death 
had been caused by crushing blows to the head which, in the 
opinion of the autopsy surgeon, could have been caused by 
several large blood-stained rocks found near the body. It 
was the opinion of the autopsy surgeon that the death had 
occurred between 6 p. m. and midnight of May 25, 1955. 
There was no alcohol in the blood of the deceased woman ; 
there was no evidence of any sexual attack or of any struggle 
having taken place ; the clothing was clean and untorn ; the 
body was free of bruises and the fingernails were long and 
unbroken. A pair of broken colored glasses was found near 
the body of the deceased. 
A search of the Sheran apartment at Greenbrae, Marin 
'Defendant pleaded not guilty and later was permitted to plead not 
guilty by reason of insanity. The latter plea was, however, withdrawn. 
1The notice of appeal declares that defendant also appeals from the 
judgment but this, apparently, bas been abandoned since the briefs 
are concerned only with the order denying his motion for a new trial. 
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on May 26th, revealed a note in the defendant's 
handwriting which read: "Dear Esme: I have decided to leave 
for a few days, so don't feel hurt if I'm not here when you 
return. I will mail you a check, and also one for the rent, 
so don't worry. All my love, Rod." A woman's handbag 
eontaining the decedent's driver's lieense and other articles 
and keys was also found in the 
Mrs. Potter, a neighbor of the Sherans, testified that she had 
seen them both in the of their apartment on tlw 
afternoon of May 25th; that she had seen Mrs. Sheran for 
the last time shortly before 5 p. m., and the defendant some 
20 minutes earlier. She testified that earlier in the afternoon 
the defendant had asked her if she would like to earn 50 cents 
an hour digging his grave. Another neighbor testified that 
she had seen the defendant sitting in his red pickup truck 
across from the apartment about 4 :30 on the afternoon of May 
25th and that she had seen the decedent a few minutes earlier. 
James Oliver testified that the defendant, with whom he had 
been acquainted for several years, had entered his store at 
Pt. Reyes Station in Marin County at about 7 p. m. on the 
night of May 25th and that he had at that time purchased a 
bottle of sweet vermouth and a bottle of Burgundy wine 
and that he had then driven off in the direction of Olema and 
San Rafael. Captain Volk of the Larkspur police department 
testified that he had seen the defendant in his truck in the 
Greenbrae area at approximately 11 :30 p. m. on May 25th; 
that he had not recognized the defendant's truck and had 
stopped him; that defendant conversed with him and that 
he appeared perfectly normal; that he had known the de-
fendant for some time. All of the witnesses testified that de-
fendant seemed perfectly normal when they had seen him 
and that he was not under the influence of alcohol. 
The defendant was picked up in his pickup truck in 
Oregon about 180 miles north and east of the California 
border on May 28, 1955. When the officer who arrested him 
told him that he was wanted in California and that he 
"imagined" the defendant knew "what for," the defendant 
replied "I think so," or "I imagine so." The officers testi-
fied that on May 28th in the county jail in Vale, Oregon, 
the defendant, in response to questions, stated that he last re-
membered seeing his wife Esme in their apartment when she 
gave him a package of cigarettes; that they got into the red 
pickup truck and went to a store in San Anselmo where he 
waited while she went inside; that they then drove to the hills 
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started and that 
When defendant was 
testified that his clothing 
unshaven and appeared 
officers testified that de-
sca.rrf'd " "bruised" and "lacer-
side of the seat in the were 
a hand-axe as well as 
suitcase; on the floor was a partially 
can of beans which had been with something 
which had left a ; a paper bag with some food 
articles was also found in the truck cab. Several rocks 
were also found in the cab of the truck. The canvas top 
covering the bed of the truck was missing3 and the card-
board liner from the inside of the cab was in the back part 
of the truck. 
All tests made on defendant's clothing, person and the 
truck were negative. 
At the trial defendant testified that after his wife got out 
of the truck in San Anselmo he remembered nothing; that 
he did not recall driving to Pt. Reyes and making his pur-
chases from Mr. Oliver; that he did not remember being 
stopped by Captain V olk in Greenbrae. He testified that 
he did not remember driving into the hills; that he did not 
recall hitting his wife with either his fists or with rocks; that 
he did not remember writing the note to his wife; that he 
did not tell the Oregon officers that he and his wife had an 
argument and that after that everything had gone '' blooey. '' 
Concerning the condition of his knuckles he testified that 
he told the officers it could have occurred while he was opening 
a can of food, or at his work of bulldozing. Defendant testi-
fied that his first recollection after stopping at the store in 
San Anselmo was waking up in "a valley" and later being on 
a highway outside of Boise, Idaho. 
The record shows that defendant had, some two or three 
years prior to the time of his arrest, been committed to 
Napa State Hospital at the instigation of his wife. He testi-
fied that when he was arrested in Oregon he thought it was 
probably because his wife had put out a wanted call for 
him and that she had "sworn out a warrant to probably re-
turn me to Napa." His testimony was to the effect that his 
3 The witnesses who had last seen him telltiiied that the canvas eover 
was on the truck on May 25th. 
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head had felt "fuzzy" while he was waiting for his wife out-
side the San Anselmo store; that he thought maybe she had 
given him a cigarette containing marijuana. He testified 
that after waking up outside of Boise, Idaho, the next thing 
be remembered was the officer who stopped him where he 
was parked off the highway in Oregon fixing a headlight on 
his truck; that he was driving the truck in the same direc-
tion as the officer had gone when the officer, who had turned 
and was coming back, motioned him to stop and told him he 
was under arrest. Defendant testified that while he was in 
the Oregon police officer's car he heard two broadcasts on the 
radio which informed the police that he had been appre-
hended and that he was wanted for murder in California. 
He testified that after the first broadcast he thought he might 
have hit somebody or run over them with his car; that after 
the second broadcast he remarked to the officer that ''I hope 
they know what they're talking about because I certainly 
don't.'' Defendant's testimony concerning the manner of 
his arrest and his statements was corroborated by the arrest-
ing officers. 
The medical testimony on behalf of the People was to the 
effect that if defendant suffered from amnesia it was probably 
of the hysterical type brought on by some great emotional 
shock, traumatic experience or fear; that such an amnesia 
would be of the retrograde type which would extend back to 
some period preceding the shock, traumatic experience or fear 
which caused it. In the expert's opinion it was ''just as 
likely" that defendant was malingering as it was that he 
was suffering from retrograde amnesia. 
The evidence heretofore set forth is substantially all of the 
evidence and is entirely circumstantial. The testimony taken 
before the grand jury is part of the record and contains evi-
dence given by defendant's mother wherein she stated that 
defendant was in great fear of being returned to Napa and 
that he had said that he would rather be dead than go back 
there. The only evidence directly, or indirectly, linking de-
fendant with the crime is that he was seen leaving the Green-
brae area with his wife in the truck, and his statement to 
the Oregon officer that he drove her into the hills where an 
argument started and that thereafter everything went 
"blooey." 
The People contend that a trial court does not have the 
power under section 1181, subdivision 6, of the Penal Code 
to weigh the evidence in order to modify a verdict or judg-
meu.t. 
Sept. 1957] PEOPLE v. SHERAN 
[49 C.2d 101; 315 P.2d 51 
107 
Section 1181, subdivision 6, provides: "When a verdict has 
been rendered against the defendant, the court may, upon his 
application, grant a new trial, in the following cases only: 
... 6. When the verdict is contrary to law or evidence, but 
if the evidence shows the defendant to be not guilty of the 
degree of the crime of which he was convicted, but guilty 
of a lesser degree thereof, or of a lesser crime included there-
in, the court may modify the judgment accordingly without 
granting or ordering a new trial, and this power shall extend 
to any court to which the cause may be appealed; ... " 
The People rely on People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal.2d 876, 
884, 885 [256 P.2d 911], People v. Sutic, 41 Cal.2d 483, 493 
[261 P.2d 241), and People v. Jones, 136 Cal.App.2d 175, 
194 [288 P.2d 544], for the proposition that the trial court 
may not weigh the evidence in order to modify the judgment 
but is held to the same rule applicable to appellate courts: 
that if there is substantial evidence in support of the judg-
ment the court may not interfere with the verdict of the jury. 
In the Daugherty case we were concerned with the rule ap-
plicable to appellate courts and we specifically stated that 
"The test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence 
to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. It is not 
whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Even though the following language in the Sutic case is 
susceptible of the construction placed on it by the People, 
the opinion, when read in its entirety shows that this court 
was considering the duty and power of an appellate court. 
It was there said: "As above discussed. the evidence fully 
justified the jury's finding that the homicide was the result 
of defendant's intent to kill and was accomplished by his 
'lying in wait' until the opportune time to strike, or that the 
homicide was a 'willful, deliberate, and premeditated' act, 
without finding as to 'lying in wait.' In either event it was 
murder in the first degree. . . . Under such circumstances 
neither the trial court nor this court would be authorized 
to reduce the degree of the crime. (People v. Daugherty, 
40 Cal.2d 876, 884-886 [256 P.2d 911].)" This statement was 
in answer to defendant's contention that the degree of the 
crime should be reduced on the ground that the evidence was 
insufficient to indicate that he had the requisite intent to 
justify a verdict of first degree murder. His motion for a 
reduction had been denied by the trial court. This court 
was there pointing out that the evidence was sufficient to 
support the determination of the trial court in denying de-
power. 
[1] The correct rule is that stated in People v. Thomas, 
25 Cal.2d 905 P.2d 7], where we were con-
struing the effect of section 1181, subdivision 6 of the Penal 
Code. In the Thomas case we had before us the question of 
the power of an appellate court to weigh the evidence in re-
ducing the degree or class of a crime. We said: "While the 
power granted to the appellate court is equal to that given 
the trial court the circumstances which will justify its exercise 
in a particular court are those which are appropriate to 
typical functioning of that court. In other words, upon an 
application to reduce the or class of an offense, a trial 
judge may review the we'ight of the evidence but an appellate 
court should consider only its sufficiency as a matter of law. 
This is in accord with the general rule stated in People v. 
Holt (1944), supra, pages 59, 70 [25 Cal.2d 59 (153 
P.2d 21)]: 'The function of the was to appraise the 
weight of the evidence; ours is to appraise its legal adequacy' 
and (p. 90) 'While the is the function of deter-
mining the facts upon the evidence it does not have the power 
of changing the standard to what constitutes murder of 
the first 
degree].' in People v. Howard 
(1930), supra, 211 Cal. P. 333, 71 A.L.R. 13851, 
are disapproved. examined the record in this case we 
do not feel constrained to hold that the evidence is legally in-
adequate to a verdict of murder of the first degree. 
the court may draw ""t""''n 
trial , and 
ferences deduced from 
court may resolve such conflicts in 






can be said as a matter of law that there is no substantial 
evidence to support a contrary that an appellate 
court will reverse the order of the trial court." (Brooks 
v. Metropolitan Ins. 27 Cal.2d 305, 307 [163 P.2d 
689]; Richardson v. , 44 CaL2d 775 P.2d 269].) 
[5] In People v. 41 CaL2d 628, 633 f262 P.2d 14], 
this court said that " 1,Vhile it is the exclusive province of the 
jury to find the facts, it is the duty of the trial court to see 
that this function is intelligently and justly performed, and 
in the exercise of its power over the verdict, the 
court, on motion for a new should consider the probative 
force of the evidence and satisfy itself that the evidence as 
a whole is sufficient to sustain the verdict.'' 
[6] The power given by the statute (Pen. Code, § 1181, 
subd. 6) to the trial court is to be exercised as that court 
typically functions (People v. Thomas, 25 Cal.2d 880, 904, 
905 [ 156 P .2d 7 J ) . The section in effect provides that in lieu 
of granting a new trial, the trial court may reduce the de-
gree or class of the crime if the evidence shows that the de-
fendant is guilty of a lesser degree or of a lesser crime. In-
asmuch as the trial court is given both the power to grant a 
new trial or reduce the degree or class of the crime in the 
same section, it would appear that the trial court's exercise 
of the power is the same in both cases. 
The second question which presents itself is whether there 
is evidence in the record, or inferences to be drawn from that 
evidence, to support the trial court's determination that the 
defendant was guilty of no crime than manslaughter. 
[7] Unless we can say as a matter of law that there is no 
evidence in the record, and that no inference can be drawn 
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from the evidence contrary to those drawn by the jury, we 
must affirm its order reducing the class of the crime. 
The People argue that malice may be implied from the 
manner in which the death occurred (People v. Modock, 46 
Cal.2d 141 [292 P.2d 897] ; People v. Powell, 34 Cal.2d 196 
[208 P.2d 974]) and that the burden was thereafter on the de-
fendant to prove circumstances in mitigation to lessen the 
degree or class of the crime. 
In the case at bar the trial judge stated that he was of 
the opinion that the evidence did not establish malice beyond 
a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. In other words, 
he did not believe that ''the evidence as a whole (was) suffi-
cient to sustain the verdict" (People v. Robarge, 41 Cal.2d 
628, 633 [262 P.2d 14] ). [8] The record shows that defendant 
lived in great fear of being returned to Napa State Hospital 
where he had been incarcerated at one time at his wife's in-
stigation; it also shows that he told the Oregon officer that he 
and his wife had driven into the hills and that an argument 
had ensued after which everything went "blooey." From 
this the inference is reasonable that the couple quarreled 
and that defendant, having lost all ability to reason, struck 
her the fatal blows in the heat of passion. (Pen. Code, § 192, 
subd. 1.) The trial judge, in judging the credibility to be given 
the witnesses, and the weight to be accorded the evidence, as 
well as the inferences to be drawn therefrom, concluded that 
he could not ''conceive of Mr. Sheran-unless this event hap-
pened in a sudden, provoked fit of anger-having killed his 
wife in open view to the public." [9] The inferences drawn 
by him from the evidence-that Esme Sheran played upon 
defendant's great fear of being returned to Napa and there-
by provoked a sudden quarrel in which the defendant killed 
her in the heat of passion-bring the case within the rule 
affirmed by this court in People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121, 
140 [169 P.2d 1], that "The provocation which will stir in 
the heart of the slayer that heat of passion which reduces the 
homicide from murder to manslaughter must be such as would 
have a like effect upon the mind and emotions of the average 
man-the man of ordinary self-control." (People v. Golsh, 
63 Cal.App. 609, 614 [219 P. 456] .) We cannot say, as a 
matter of law, that the evidence and the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom, do not support the trial court's conclusion 
that defendant was guilty of no greater crime than man-
slaughter. [3b] Where the only conflict consists of infer-
ences deduced from uncontradicted probative facts, the trial 
Sept.l957] PEOPLE v. SHERAN 
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court may, on a motion for a new trial, resolve such conflicts 
and draw inferences opposed to those drawn by the jury at 
the trial. (Mercantile Trust Co. v. Sunset etc. Co., 176 Cal. 
451, 456 [168 P. 1033]; Cauhape v. Security Savings Bank, 
118 Cal. 82, 84 [50 P. 310].) 
Defendant appeals from the order denying his motion for 
a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence. It 
appears that after the trial defendant subjected himself to 
two sodium pentothal examinations. As a result of these 
examinations and some dreams defendant thought he could re-
call some of his movements on May 25th. A careful scrutiny 
of the results of the examinations shows that defendant's 
recollection could have been of occurrences at any time prior 
to the day in question. He sought to establish that he had 
driven many miles around Marin County on a trip which 
would have taken some four or more hours and would have 
made it impossible for him to have committed the crime as 
early as six or seven in the evening. He recalled having 
crawled through a new fence with a bottle in each hand; 
that the fence was near a small oak tree. The bottles were 
later found at the point where he recalled having placed 
them, but the evidence was far from conclusive that his 
recollection was of the day of the crime. 
[10] To entitle a party to a new trial on the ground of 
newly discovered evidence it must appear that the evidence is 
not merely cumulative, but is material, and that it is such 
as to render a different result probable on retrial; and that 
the party could not with reasonable diligence have discovered 
and produced it at the trial. (People v. llicGarry, 42 Cal.2d 
429 [267 P.2d 254]; People v. Miller, 37 Cal.2d 801 [236 P.2d 
137).) [11] We cannot say, as a matter of law, that a dif-
ferent result would have been probable on a new trial. The 
evidence did not fill the many gaps left open by defendant's 
failure to remember the occurrences of May 25th. Further-
more, no reason was given as to defendant's failure to submit 
to the sodium pentothal examinations prior to, or during the 
course of, the trial. The motion was properly denied. 
The order modifying the verdict by reducing the class of 
the offense from second dc>gr('e murder to manslaughter is 
affirmed. The order denying defendant's motion for a new 
trial is affirmed, from which it must necessarily follow that 
the judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., Spence, 
J., and McComb, J ., concurred. 
